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A CRITIQUE OF THE USE OF SECONDARY
CONSIDERATIONS IN APPLYING THE SECTION
103 NONOBVIOUSNESS TEST FOR
PATENTABILITY
Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries."L This grant forms the basis of the
modern American patent law system. 2 Pursuant to this grant, Congress enacted the 1952
Patent Acts ("the 1952 Act"), which set forth three requirements for patentability.* One
of the requirements, contained in section 103 of the 1952 Act, is that for an invention
to be patentable, "the subject matter [of the invention] as a whole [must not] have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains." In 1966, the Supreme Court, in Graham v. John
Deere Go., held that section 103 requires courts to evaluate nonobviousness based on
publicly available information relating to the invention existing at the time the invention
was made.* Such information is commonly referred to as the prior art. 7
 The Court stated
that the nonobviousness test involves evaluating three considerations based on the prior
art: the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and
the claimed invention, and the level of ordinary skill in the art.s
Courts have experienced difficulty applying the section 103 nonobviousness tests
One reason for this difficulty is that courts often lack sufficient training in science or
engineering to be able to understand the prior art and the claimed invention, 10 Another
reason is that courts find it difficult to determine whether the claimed invention would
have been obvious at the time it was made without relying on hindsight or reading the
inventor's own disclosure into the prior art." In response to these problems, courts have
resorted to using non-technical objective factors, often called secondary considerations
U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
1 W. ROBINSON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS Ch. III § 46 (1890).
Act of Jul. 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792.
4 The three criteria for patentability are utility, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1985); novelty, id. § 102; and
nonobviousness, id. § 103.
5 1d. § 103.
6 See I P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 7.01 (rev. 2d ed. 1985).
7 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
Id.
6 See Reiner v. 1. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929
(1961) (difficult for court to determine whether invention would have been obvious to one skilled
in the art when court is totally unfamiliar with the art); Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v.
General Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1946) (courts unfamiliar with field of invention likely
to underrate or overrate difficulties in making invention); Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness": A
Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. Rev, 1169, 1170 (1964) [hereinafter Penn.
Note].
L° See Graham, 383 U.S. at 36; Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1170.
" See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1091-93 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (district
court erroneously decided obviousness issue by using inventor's discovery as a guide in interpreting
prior art); 2 D. CHISUM, PATENTS 5.05, at 234 (1985).
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or subtests of nonobviousness, as aids in applying section 103. 12 These factors ("secondary
considerations") focus on the economic and motivational aspects of nonobviousness,
rather than the technological aspects." They include evidence of commercial success,"
fulfillment of a long-felt but unsolved need,I 5 licensing to potential competitors," copying
by an infringer,' 2 progress of the patent application through the Patent and Trademark
Office," near-simultaneous invention by another researcher in the field, 19 and profes-
sional approval by experts in the field."
Considerable controversy exists regarding the proper role of secondary considera-
tions in the obviousness analysis." This controversy exists because the Supreme Court
explicitly endorsed the use of secondary considerations in Graham, 22 but failed to clarify
their role. Specifically, the Court did not indicate what weight they were to be given
relative to the three prior art considerations, or whether all the secondary considerations
were to have equal weight. 23 One view which has emerged is that the secondary consid-
erations are relevant only when the outcome of the nonobviousness test is ambiguous
based on the three prior art considerations alone." The Supreme Court, in cases decided
subsequent to Graham, appears to have supported this view." Another view is that the
secondary considerations form the fourth part of the section 103 nonobviousness test
and in some cases are to be given greater weight than the three prior art considerations."
12 See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v, Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert,
denied, 105 S. Ct. 172 (1984); Reiner, 285 F.2d at 503-04; Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1172.
" See Graham, 383 U.S. at 35-36; Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1172.
" See Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 495-96 (1877); Simmons Fastener
Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2138 (1985). See generally Boyer, Commercial Success as Evidence of Patentability, 37 FORDHAM L. REV.
573 (1969).
' 5 See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1473-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Safety Car, 155 F.2d at 939.
16 See Easel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 55-56 (1923); Philip
v. Mayer, Rothkopf Indus., Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 753, 763 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 635 F.2d 1056 (2d
Cir. 1980).
' 7 See Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 440-41 (1911); Vanden-
berg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
' 8 See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52 (1966).
19 See Graham v. Jeoffroy Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 1953).
20 See Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 713 F.2d 693, 697-98 (Fed.
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
21 See Cinsum, supra note 11, at 237-38 and cases cited therein.
22 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
22 However, in Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) and Colgate-Palmolive
Co. v. Cook Chemical Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), two cases consolidated with Graham v. John Deere
Co., the Court dismissed evidence of long-felt but unsolved need and commercial success, noting
that they did not "tip the scales of patentability" in this case because the patented device exhibited
"exceedingly small and quite non-technical mechanical differences in a device which was old in the
art." Id. at 36. For a further discussion of Calmar and Colgate-Palmolive, see infra notes 83-88 and
accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., Walker v. General Motors Corp., 362 F.2d 56, 60 (9th Cir. 1966) (evidence of
commercial success, licensing, and copying does not outweigh clear case of obviousness based on
prior art considerations).
" See infra note 95.
99 See, e.g., In re Fielder, 471 F.2d 640, 645 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (evidence of commercial success
may be directly relevant to issue of obviousness and should always be evaluated before final decision
is reached); In re Tiffin, 443 F.2d 394, 400 (C.C.P.A. 1971), modified cm other grounds, 448 F.2d 791
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This is the position which the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which has jurisdiction over patent-related appeals from the federal district courts and
the Patent and Trademark Board of Appeals," has adopted."
The Federal Circuit has particularly emphasized commercial success, 29 long-felt but
unsolved need," and professional approval" as secondary considerations which are
relevant to the obviousness issue. In 1984, in Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works,
Inc., for example, the Federal Circuit ruled that evidence of commercial success com-
pelled a conclusion of nonobviousness, even though the invention would have been held
obvious based on the prior art considerations alone. 32 Similarly, in In re Piasecki, the
Federal Circuit, in 1984, ruled that evidence of long-felt but unsolved need and profes-
sional approval rebutted a prima facie case of obviousness based on the prior art con-
siderations." Thus, according to the Federal Circuit, commercial success, long-felt but
unsolved need, and professional approval are secondary considerations which may be
sufficient standing alone to support a legal conclusion of nonobviousness.
The Federal Circuit's position is significant because commentators have suggested
that it will likely become the authoritative position regarding the role of secondary
considerations in the section 103 nonobviousness analysis." According to commentators,
the Supreme Court will probably defer to the Federal Circuit, even though the Court's
position may be inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's position, because the Court
recognizes that Congress intended the Federal Circuit to establish uniform standards in
the patent law field, and because the Court's caseload is very heavy. 33 Thus, the federal
courts and the Patent and Trademark Office will most likely follow the Federal Circuit."
The purpose of this note is to provide a critical appraisal of the use of secondary
considerations in determining nonobviousness. Section 1 reviews the development of the
section 103 nonobviousness requirement." Section II then examines the use of individual
secondary considerations in evaluating nonobviousness, including the Federal Circuit's
treatment of those considerations." In section III, this note proposes that to be consistent
(C.C.P.A.) (commercial success and long-felt but unsolved need can rebut prima facie case of
obviousness based on prior art considerations).
27 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1985).
28 See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1099-1100 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (sec-
ondary considerations not only reflect inadequacy of prior art, but compel a conclusion of nonob-
viousness); Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472; Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888,
895-96 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 187 (1984) (quoting Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724
F.2d 951, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 127 (1984)).
" See, e.g., Simmons, 739 F.2d at 1575-76.
" See, e.g., Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1475.
3 I Id.
32 739 F.2d 1573, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cerl. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2138 (1985).
33 745 F.2d 1468, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
34 See Note, Patent Law Reform via the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982: The Transformation
of Patentability Jurisprudence, 17 AKRON L. REV. 453, 455 (1984) [hereinafter Akron Note]; Petrowitz,
Federal Court Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982—And Beyond, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 543,
557 (1983).
35
 Akron Note, supra note 34, at 455; Petrowitz, supra note 34, at 557.
35 Akron Note, supra note 34, at 455; Petrowitz, supra note 34, at 557. This is especially true
because the Federal Circuit hears all patent-related appeals from the federal district courts and the
Patent and Trademark Board of Appeals. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 44-103 and accompanying text for discussion.
98 See infra notes 104-95 and accompanying text for discussion.
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with the statutory language of section 103, only those secondary considerations which
are probative of the state of mind of a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time
the invention was made are relevant in applying section 103." Long-felt but unsolved
need, professional approval, and near-simultaneous invention are secondary considera-
tions which are relevant to the state of mind issue, and should form the fourth part of
the section 103 nonobviousness test. 4° Commercial success, licensing, copying by an
infringer, and progess through the Patent and Trademark Office, however, are second-
ary considerations which are not relevant to the state of mind issue, and should never
be given any independent weight in evaluating nonobviousness. 4 ' Instead, commercial
success, licensing, and copying by an infringer are only relevant as evidence of long-felt
but unsolved need to demonstrate successful fulfillment of the need.42 Finally, this note
suggests that Congress should amend section 103 to make clear that the section 103
nonobviousness test is a four-part test consisting of the three prior art considerations
and secondary considerations which are relevant to the state of mind issue."
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECTION 103 NoNoEvtousNEss REQUIREMENT
Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to "promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts" by granting patents to inventors.'" Supreme Court decisions
have held that inherent in this grant of power is the requirement that for an inventor's
discovery to be patentable, it must be sufficiently innovative so that it represents a genuine
contribution to public knowledge." Article I, section 8, according to the Court, thus
embodies a cost-benefit analysis." The Constitution recognizes that while granting pat-
ents benefits society by encouraging technological advancement, there is also a cost to
society associated with restricting the free flow of knowledge. 47 It therefore limits the
granting of patents to situations in which the invention is so innovative that the benefit
to society outweighs the cost."
Congress first attempted to implement the patentability standard expressed in the
Constitution by enacting the Patent Act of 1790 42
 which permitted the federal govern-
ment to grant a patent with a term of fourteen years for an "invention or discovery
[which was] sufficiently useful and important .. .."" The Patent Act of 1793 replaced
" See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text for discussion.
4° See infra notes 202-18 and accompanying text for discussion.
" See infra notes 219-55 and accompanying text for discussion.
42 See id.
49
 See infra note 256 and accompanying text for discussion.
" U.S. CONS'''. art. 1, 8, cI. 8.
" Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp„ 390 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring).
46
 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 6-9.
47 Id. at 9; Note, Endorsing the Application of Non-Technical Factual Considerations for Obviousness
Determinations in Combination Patent Cases — Nickola v. Petersen, 10 U. Tot.. L. REV. 1011, 1016 (1979)
[hereinafter Toledo Note]. For example, one benefit of granting patents is that they encourage
investment in long-term research and development. The disadvantage, however, is that patents,
which are proprietary monopolies, are not in the best interests of a freely-competitive economy. See
id.
" See Toledo Note, supra note 47, at 1016.
49
 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
" Id. The term of a utility patent is currently seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. 154 (1985). The
term of a design patent is currently fourteen years. Id. § 173.
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the "sufficiently useful and important" test with the tests of utility and novelty." Utility
and novelty remained the only statutory prerequisites for patentability until 1952. 52 In
1851, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood" created a third
prerequisite for patentability, that of "invention." 54
In Hotchkiss, the patent involved clay and porcelain-formed doorknobs. 55
 The only
distinction over prior art doorknobs was the substitution of clay or porcelain, both of
which were well-known materials, for wood or metal. 56
 Although the patented doorknobs
admittedly passed the utility and novelty tests, the Court held the patent invalid, stating
that for a discovery to be patentable it had to exhibit a degree of skill and ingenuity
which distinguished it from the work of an ordinary mechanic." The "invention" test
thus denied patents for discoveries which, although useful and novel, merely represented
minor alterations of existing devices or processes. 56
During the period between Hotchkiss and the 1952 Act, both the lower courts and
the Supreme Court encountered problems in applying the Hotchkiss invention test be-
cause of the difficulty associated with defining invention. 59
 This difficulty led to a variety
of invention tests. 66
 One such test, which the Supreme Court applied between 1930 and
1950,6 ' was a very strict invention test, which resulted in the Court holding most patents
which it examined during this period invalid.62
In 1952, Congress codified the judicially-developed invention requirement as the
nonobviousness requirement embodied in section 103 of the 1952 Act, 65 thereby making
it the third statutory prerequisite of patentability in addition to the utility and novelty
requirements." According to the drafters, the purpose of section 103 was to add uni-
formity and definiteness to the field of patent law. 65
 Section 103 provides in pertinent
part:
A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and prior art are such that the subject matter
"Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318.
53
 The 1952 Patent Act codified the utility and novelty requirements as sections 101 and 102,
respectively, of Title 35, United States Code. See supra note 4.
53 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
54 Id. at 265.
" Id. at 264.
" Id. at 265.
57
 See id. at 265-66.
" See id.; Toledo Note, supra note 47, at 1018.
51' See e.g., McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S, 419, 427 (1891), where the Supreme Court stated,
"The truth is the word [invention] cannot be defined in such a manner as to afford substantial aid
in determining whether a particular device involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not." Id.
See Toledo Note, supra note 47, at 1018 n.36,
6 ' See, e.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950);
Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941); Toledo Note, supra note 47, at
1019.
62
 Justice Jackson commented on the Court's restrictive position, stating that "the only patent
that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on." Jungersen v. Ostby &
Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) ( Jackson, J., dissenting). See also Toledo Note, supra note 47,
at 1019 n.41.
63
 Act of Jul. 19, 1952, 35 U.S.C. 103 (1985).
64
 See supra note 4.
65 S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS
2394, 2400.
362	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 28:357
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter per-
tains. 66
After section 103 was enacted a split arose among the lower courts as to whether
Congress intended the nonobviousness requirement to replace the strict Supreme Court
invention test applied between 1930 and 1950 with a more lenient patentability stan-
dard.° This split frustrated Congress's attempt to create uniformity and definiteness in
the patent law area. 68 In 1966, the Supreme Court resolved this split in the consolidated
cases of Graham v. John Deere Co., Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co., and Colgate-Palmolive
Co. v. Cook Chemical Co. ("Graham"). 69
In Graham, the Court explained that when Congress added section 103 it intended
to codify the judicially-developed "invention" requirement first set forth in Hotchkics. 7°
Congress did not, the Court stated, intend to change the general level of patentability,
which the Court asserted had remained invariable despite claims that previous decisions
had raised the level." The Court explained that the only difference between the Hotchkiss
test and section 103 was that in section 103 Congress replaced the vague, ambiguous
term "invention" with "nonobviousness" to provide a more definite and workable stan-
dard." The Court indicated its approval of section 103, stating that it represented a
bb 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1985). Section 102, the novelty requirement, defines the types of references
which qualify as prior art for the purposes of section 103. In 1984, Congress amended section 103
to exclude certain types of prior art by adding the following paragraph.:
Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies aslprior art only tinder
subsection (f) or (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not preclude patentabilitynder
this section where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the
invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assign-
ment to the same person.
,-t
hi., amended by Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 103, 98 Stat. 3384 (1984). Subsections (f) and (g) of section
102 provide that a person is entitled to a patent unless:
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or ( . 1
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country
by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In deterMining
priority of invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of con-
ception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence
of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to
conception by the other.
Id.	 102 (1985).
67 See generally Beckett, Judicial Construction of the Patent Act of 1952–Codification v. Substantive
Change, 37 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 467 (1955); Note, The Standard of Patentability —Judicial Interpretation
of Section 103 of the Patent Act, 63 Comm'. L. REV. 306 (1963). Cases holding that section 103 codified
existing case law as exemplified by A&P include Hawley Prods. Co. v. U.S. Trunk Co., 259 F.2d
69, 72 (Ist Cir. 1958). Cases holding that section 103 reinstated the Hotchkiss standard of patentability
include Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530, 534-37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
911 (1955).
68 See Toledo Note, supra note 47, at 1021.
69
 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
70 Id. at 15.
	 •
71 1d. at 17, 19. The Court explained that the strict standard exemplified in its decisions of the
previous 20-30 years reflected rapid advances in technology and an increase in the scope of
applicable prior art, rather than an actual increase in the standard of patentability over the Hotchkiss
standard. Id. at 19,
72 1d. at 14. The Court also noted that Congress intended to abolish the flash of genius test. Id.
at 15. The flash of genius test was first proposed in Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,
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practical test of patentability consistent with the standard of patentability expressed in
the Constitution." The Court then proposed that the nonobviousness test mandated
under section 103 was a three-part test which involved determining the scope and content
of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, and
the level of ordinary skill in the art."
After setting out the three-part test mandated under section 103, the Court sug-
gested that certain non-prior art considerations, which the Court referred to as secondary
considerations, might also be used as part of the section 103 test." These secondary
considerations, according to the Court, included evidence of commercial success, long-
felt but unsolved needs, and failure of others." The Court explained that secondary
considerations were useful in applying section 103 because they focused on the economic
and motivational aspects of nonobviousness, rather than the technological aspects."
Secondary considerations, the Court stated, would make it easier for judges and jurors,
who often lack training in science or engineering, to evaluate nonobviousness." The
Court also noted that secondary considerations might prevent courts from using hind-
sight or reading the inventor's discovery into the prior art when determining whether
the claimed invention would have been obvious at the time it was made."
After setting out the nonobviousness test required under section 103, the Court
applied it to the two patents at issue." In Graham v. John Deere Co., the patent involved
a shock-absorbing device for plowing equipment used in plowing rocky soil." The Court
analyzed the pertinent prior art and concluded that the claimed invention would have
been obvious because it involved an assemblage of well-known mechanical elements
combined in a way taught by the prior art. 82 In the companion cases of Calmar and
Colgate -Palmolive, the Court similarly invalidated the single patent at issue for obviousness
based on the prior art." The patent covered a finger-operated pump sprayer with a lid
which functioned as a built-in dispenser for liquids." To prove nonobviousness, the
patentee had offered evidence of long-felt but unsolved need and commercial success,
two of the secondary considerations which the Court had suggested might be relevant
in applying section 103. 85 The Court, however, held that in this case the secondary
314 U.S. 84 (1941). In Curia, the Supreme Court had stated that one requirement for patentability
was that "the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the Hash of creative genius, not
merely the skill of the calling." Id. at 91. According to the Graham Court, Cuno simply intended to
restate the Hotchkiss invention test. Graham, 383 U.S. at 15 n.7. Nevertheless, Congress provided in
§ 103 that "Iplatentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made,"
to emphasize that the mental process by which the inventor arrives at his discovery is immaterial.
See Reviser's Note accompanying 35 U.S.C.
78 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
'1 Id.
75 Id. at 17-18 (citing Penn. Note, supra note 9).
75 Id.
" Graham, 383 U.S. at 35-36.
78 Id.
75 Id.
85 Id. at 19-37.
81 Id. at 19-21.
88 Id. at 22-26.
85 Id. at 36-37.
84 Id. at 26-27.
85 Id. at 35.
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considerations failed to "tip the scales of patentability."" The Court reasoned that once
the scope of the prior art was properly defined," the prior art clearly suggested the
minor mechanical modifications distinguishing the patentee's finger-pump sprayers from
existing, prior art finger-pump sprayers."
The Supreme Court in Graham thus required courts to evaluate nonobviousness by
comparing the prior art with the claimed invention. 89 Although the Court also indicated
that secondary considerations were relevant to the inquiry, it failed to clarify their role
because Calmar and Colgate -Palmolive involved an unambiguous case of obviousness based
upon prior art considerations alone." Thus, it was unclear what the Court intended
when it stated that in Calmar and Colgate-Palmolive secondary considerations "failed to
tip the scales of patentability."91 Specifically, the Court left open the issues of what weight
secondary considerations were to be given relative to the three prior art considerations,
and whether all secondary considerations were to have equal weight.92
The issues left unanswered by Graham produced a great deal of confusion among
the lower courts, resulting in the development of two different positions regarding the
proper role of secondary considerations. 93 One position maintained that secondary con-
siderations were relevant only when the outcome of the nonobviousness test was ambig-
uous based upon the three prior art considerations alone. 94 The Supreme Court itself,
in cases subsequent to Graham, appeared to support this view. 99 The other position,
whose most notable proponent was the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("the
CCPA"),98 maintained that secondary considerations were the fourth part of the section
103 nonobviousness test and in some cases were entitled to greater weight than the three
prior art considerations."
96 Id. at 36.
92 Id. at 35. The patentee had argued that the scope of the prior art only included references
describing pump sprayers, and thus did not include a reference describing pouring spouts for
liquid containers. Id. The Court, however, disagreed. Id.
99 Id. at 36.
99 id. at 17.
9° See id. at 36.
See id.
92 See id. at 35-36; Akron Note, supra note 34, at 465; Toledo Note, supra note 47, at 1023.
95 See Toledo Note, supra note 47, at 1023-24, 1027.
94 See, e.g., Walker v. General Motors Corp., 362 F.2d 56, 60 (9th Cir. 1966) (evidence of
commercial success, licensing, and copying does not outweigh clear case of obviousness based on
prior art considerations).
95 Since Graham, the Supreme Court has addressed the obviousness issue in four cases: United
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396
U.S. 57 (1969); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273
(1976). The Court has held that secondary factors such as commercial success "without invention
will not make patentability." Dann, 425 U.S. at 230 n.4 (quoting Great Atlantic &Pacific Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)). This could indicate either that secondary considerations
will only be evaluated when the question of obviousness based on the three prior art considerations
is close, or that secondary considerations will always be evaluated in the obviousness analysis but
will only be given substantial weight when the obviousness question based on the three prior art
considerations is close. In either case, the Court's position is inconsistent with the CCPA's position
set forth in In re Tiffin, 443 F.2d 394, 400 (C.C.P.A.), modified on other grounds, 448 F.2d 791
(C.C.P.A. 1971), where the CCPA held that secondary considerations outweighed a prima facie case
of obviousness based on the prior art. See infra note 97.
96
 In 1982, Congress merged the CCPA with the Court of Claims to create the Federal Circuit.
See infra note 98.
97 See, e.g., In re Fielder, 471 F.2d 640, 644 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (evidence of commercial success
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The Federal Circuit, which Congress created in 1982 98 to succeed the CCPA, has
adopted the position of the CCPA that secondary considerations represent the fourth
part of the section 103 nonobviousness test" and must always be considered before a
court makes the legal conclusion of obviousness or nonobviousness. 199 Secondary consid-
erations, the Federal Circuit has asserted, are valuable because they tell the "human,
real world story" surrounding the development of the claimed invention." Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit has held that while the weight given to secondary considerations is
a function of the extent of their relationship to the merits of the claimed invention, in
some cases they are sufficient standing alone to support a legal conclusion of nonob-
viousness.'" The Federal Circuit has placed particular emphasis on the factors of com-
mercial success, long-felt but unsolved need, and professional approval.'"
To understand the role of secondary considerations in applying the section 103
nonobviousness test, the next section of this note first discusses the general rationale
underlying the use of secondary considerations as part of the nonobviousness analysis.
It then examines the chain of reasoning through which individual secondary consider-
ations are related to the issue of nonobviousness, and describes the Federal Circuit's
treatment of individual secondary considerations in applying the section 103 nonobvious-
ness test.
II. THE USE OF SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS IN APPLYING THE SECTION 103
NONOBVIOUSNESS TEST
Secondary considerations are non-technical, objective indicia of obviousness or non-
obviousness which focus the section 103 inquiry on economic and motivational issues
surrounding the development of the claimed invention." They are secondary in that
unlike the prior art they are relevant to the question of obviousness through a series of
may be directly relevant to issue of obviousness, and therefore should always be evaluated before
final decision is reached); Tiffin, 443 F.2d at 400 (commercial success and long-felt but unsolved
need can rebut a prima facie case of obviousness based on prior art considerations).
N Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). In creating
the Federal Circuit, Congress merged the CCPA and the Court of Claims. S. REP, No. 275, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS I I, 12.
" Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In Vandenberg, the
Federal Circuit stated:
In determining the question of obviousness, inquiry should always be made into
whatever objective evidence of' nonobviousness there may be. The so-called "secondary
considerations" can often prevent a court from slipping into an impermissable hind-
sight analysis. They should be considered as a fourth factual inquiry under Graham
before coming to a conclusion concerning obviousness.
Id. at 1567 (citations omitted).
'Go Id. See also Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In
re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 996 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Federal Circuit has thus adopted the position
o?the CCPA. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
101 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
102 See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 306 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Panduit, 774 F.2d at 1099-1100; Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 895-
96 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 187 (1984) (quoting Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d
951, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 127 (1984)).
' 03 See, e.g., Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575-76 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2138 (1985) (commercial success); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468,
1475 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (long-felt but unsolved need and professional approval).
1 rm See Graham, 383 U.S. at 36; Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1171-72.
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inferences.'" These secondary considerations include evidence of commercial success,
fulfillment of a long-felt but unsolved need, licensing to potential competitors, copying
by an infringer, progress of the patent application through the Patent and Trademark
Office, near-simultaneous invention by another researcher in the field, and professional
approval by experts in the field. 106
Courts have used secondary considerations both before and after Congress codified
the Hotchkiss invention test. 10'7 as section 103. 1 " Their use developed in response to
problems which courts encountered attempting to determine what the prior art would
have suggested to workers of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was
made.'" One problem was that courts, being composed of laypersons, were often unable
to comprehend the technical aspects of the prior art and the claimed invention."°
Although this problem was not serious when the invention was relatively simple and
straightforward, it became particularly acute as technology became increasingly com-
plex."' Another problem was that courts could never be sure whether they were relying
on hindsight or reading the inventor's own discovery into the prior art." 2 The use of
adversarial expert witnesses, commentators note, did not alleviate these problems because
the experts often offered conflicting testimony, thus failing to provide adequate guid-
ance. 15
The use of secondary considerations substantially simplified the obviousness inquiry
for the courts. Because secondary considerations were non-technical, courts could readily
apply them in analyzing whether complex inventions would have been obvious.'" In
'" See Address by D. Chisum, AIPLA Annual Meeting (Oct. 26, 1989), reprinted in 1984 AIPLA
Bulletin 618, 620. For examples of the inferences underlying individual secondary considerations,
see infra notes 116-83 and accompanying text. Not all courts and commentators agree that second-
ary considerations are secondary because they are relevant to the obviousness issue through a series
of inferences. See Markey, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 675, 684 (1975) (secondary considerations are
secondary because they occur or become relevant after the invention is made); Kaiser Indus. Corp.
v. McLouth Steel Corp., 400 F.2d 36, 41 (fith Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1119 (1969) (secondary
considerations are secondary in importance to more direct evidence of obviousness). Part of the
disagreement may be a result of the Supreme Court's characterization of the considerations as
"secondary" in Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18, while citing for support Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness":
A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1964), which characterized the
considerations as "subtests."
106 See Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1172-83. See also supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
1 ° 7 See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hotchkiss invention test.
'"" For examples of cases before section 103 in which courts have used secondary considerations,
see, e.g., Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486 (1877) (commercial success); Eibel
Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923) (licensing). For examples of
cases after section 103 in which courts have used secondary considerations, see, e.g., Lyon v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 911 (1955) (long-felt but unsolved
need); W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 172 (1984) (long-felt but unsolved need, professional approval, and commercial success).
1'9 See Reiner v. 1. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929
(1961); Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. General Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1946);
Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1170.
'I" See Graham, 383 U.S. at 36; Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1170.
"' Graham, 383 U.S. at 36; Penn Note, supra note 9, at 1170.
" 2 See Panduit, 779 F.2d at 1091-93; CHtsust, supra note I I, at 234.
113 See Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1170; Cutisum, supra note 11, at 234.
" 4 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 35-36; Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1172. Secondary considerations
were equally applicable in evaluating whether fairly simple devices and processes would have been
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addition, because secondary considerations gave insight into the circumstances surround-
ing the development of the claimed invention, their use reduces the danger that the
obviousness evaluation would be based on hindsight, or that the inventor's discovery
would inadvertently be read into the prior art."' The following is a description of the
individual secondary considerations which courts have used in determining whether an
invention would have been obvious.
A. Long-Felt but Unsolved Need
Commentators have suggested that the rationale behind the use of long-felt but
unsolved need as evidence of nonobviousness is that a defect in an existing product or
process creates an economic incentive for researchers to develop a solution to the
defect." Given the economic reward if a solution is found, one can infer that if the
defect persisted for a long period of time, its solution was not obvious." 7
In order to show that evidence of long-felt but unsolved need is probative of
nonobviousness, courts and commentators agree that patentees must prove two things." 8
First, they must prove that the defect existed and that there was a need for a solution
to the defect." 9
 They can do this by showing that other skilled researchers in the field,
working under the same state of the art, attempted to find a solution but failed.m
Second, the patentees must prove that their solutions satisfied the need.' 21 They can do
this, for example, by showing that their solutions achieved commercial success.' 22
obvious. See Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 697 F.2d 1313, 1320 n.16 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1052 (1984).
" 3 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 36; Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1143-44
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Core, 721 F.2d at 1553.
" See Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1172.
" 7 See id.
" 9 See Lyon, 224 F.2d at 535; Cinsum, supra note 11, at 240.1-242.
119
 Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1173; CHISUM, supra note 11, at 240.1. Factors such as the
length of time the need existed and the amount of research which the industry expended to find
a solution will influence the weight which evidence of long-felt but unsolved need is given. See Lyon,
224 F.2d at 535; Safety Car, 155 F.2d at 939.
120
 See Critsum, supra note 11, at 240.1-241; Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1173-74. The law
presumes that those of ordinary skill in the art are familiar with all the pertinent prior art. See
EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 908 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Davis, J., concurring).
However, this presumption is not necessarily true when the prior art is obscure or in a foreign
language, and thus not readily accessible to those of ordinary skill in the art. Id. Under such
circumstances, long-felt but unsolved need is not very probative of nonobviousness because it is
likely that the invention would have been developed sooner if the prior art had been well-known.
Id.
' 21 CI-MUM, supra note II, at 242.
122 See Gore, 721 F.2d at 1555, where the Federal Circuit ruled that art increase in annual dollar
sales from zero to seven million in the first five years that fabric laminates embodying the claimed
invention were available indicated fulfillment of a long-felt need and therfore that the invention
would not have been obvious. See also Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of California,
713 F.2d 693, 697-98 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). In Environmental Designs,
evidence showing that the patentee's process for removing sulfur from effluent gas fulfilled a long-
felt need to remove a maximum amount of sulfur from the atmosphere and made stricter sulfur
dioxide standards possible indicated that the claimed process would not have been obvious. Id. See
also CHISUM, supra note 11, at 242.
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The Federal Circuit has given substantial weight to long-felt but unsolved need as
evidence of nonobviousness, as illustrated by In re Piasecki.' 23 In Piasecki, the Federal
Circuit ruled that evidence of long-felt but unsolved need was sufficient to rebut a prima
facie case of obviousness based on prior art considerations.'" Piasecki involved a patent
application covering a lighter-than-air craft capable of lifting heavy loads, but featuring
the aerodynamic propulsion and control features of a helicopter.'" During the prose-
cution of the application,' the Examiner established a prima facie case of obviousness
based on the prior art considerations. 126 The applicant attempted to rebut the Examiner's
case by submitting evidence of long-felt but unsolved need.' 27 The evidence consisted of
affidavits showing that a long-felt need existed for an aircraft having the characteristics
of the applicant's aircraft, and that in recognition of this need the Navy, NASA, and
other governmental agencies sponsored a workshop of experts in aircraft technology to
fulfill the need.' 28
 At this workshop, the applicant and forty-seven other researchers
presented their solutions, but only the applicant's solution received immediate favorable
approval from experts and funding for further development.'"
Despite the applicant's strong showing that his discovery fulfilled a long-felt but
unsolved need, the Examiner rejected the application.'" The Patent and Trademark
Office Board of Appeals upheld the Examiner's decision, noting that secondary consid-
erations by their very nature were never sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of obvious-
ness based on the prior art.'" The Federal Circuit, however, reversed, holding that in
this case evidence of the failure of others to solve a long-standing problem and of
immediate acceptance by experts was sufficient to rebut the Examiner's prima facie
case.'" The court explained that the evidence of long-felt but unsolved need indicated
that the claimed invention would have been obvious based on the prior art considerations
only when viewed with the aid of hindsight.'" According to the Federal Circuit, there-
fore, evidence of long-felt but unsolved need is independently relevant to the issue of
nonobviousness.'"
B. Commercial Success
The rationale supporting the use of commercial success as evidence of nonobvious-
ness, according to commentators, is similar to that of long-felt but unsolved need except
that it focuses on the actions of buyers rather than researchers working contempora-
neously with the patentee.'" The commercial success reasoning thus includes an addi-
123 745 F.2d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
124 /d. at 1475.
in a at 1969-70.
126 hi. at 1470-71.
127 Id. at 1973-74.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1475.
1 " Id. at 1471.
13I Id.
152 Id. at 1475.
I" See id. at 1474.
134 For other Federal Circuit decisions indicating that evidence of long-felt but unsolved need
is independently relevant to the nonobviousness question, see Pancluii, 774 F.2d at 1099; Perkin-
Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888,895 (Fed. Or. 1984).
' 35 See Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1175; CHISUM, supra note 11, at 244.
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tional inferential step. It assumes that the possibility of achieving commercial success
provides an economic incentive for researchers to find a solution to a defect in an
existing device or process." 6 Therefore, if the patentee's solution is commercially suc-
cessful one can infer that it is nonobvious because its commercial success is evidence that
others attempted to find a solution but failed.'"
For evidence of commercial success to be relevant to nonobviousness, commentators
and courts have required patentees to prove two things. 1 " First, they must prove that
their solutions were in fact commercially successful.'" To do so, they must introduce
evidence showing market share, growth in market share, or displacement of existing
prior art devices. 14° Courts have noted that absolute sales figures alone are not sufficient
to establish commercial success because there is no standard against which to compare
the figures to determine if they are significant.' 4 ' Second, once patentees have established
the existence of commercial success, they must show that it is due to the merits of their
inventions and not to extrinsic factors such as advertising or concentrated sales efforts. 142
The Federal Circuit accorded great weight to evidence of commercial success in
Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Ine.,I 43 in which the court ruled that evidence
of commercial success was sufficient to overcome a conclusion of obviousness based on
the prior art considerations." 4 The patent at issue in Simmons involved self-adhering
screw anchor fasteners for refrigerators."' At trial, the parties stipulated to commercial
success because both the patentee and the accused infringer had sold millions of fasteners
embodying the claimed invention. 146 The trial court nevertheless held the patent invalid
for obviousness, explaining that commercial success could not save an invention which
236 Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1175. See also Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for
Patents, 491 PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 237, 283 (1967).
233 Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1175; CHISUM, supra note 11, at 244.
138 See Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Penn. Note, supra note
9, at 1175-77.
233 See Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1175-77; Boyer, Commercial Success as Evidence of Patentability,
37 Foam-1AM L. Rev. 573, 594-95.
' 41 See Kansas jack, 719 F.2d at 1150-51; Boyer, supra note 139, at 595.
141 See Kansas Jack, 719 F.2d at 1151, where the Federal Circuit held that a patent covering a
vehicle frame straightening device was invalid for obviousness based on the prior art. The court
explained that evidence of commercial success was not probative of nonobviousness because the
evidence consisted solely of the number of devices sold. Id. See also Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v.
Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1026-27 (Fed. Gir. 1985).
142 See Cable Electric, 770 F.2d at 1026; Kansas Jack, 719 F.2d at 1151. For example, in Pentec,
Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309 (Fed. Cir. 1985), the Federal Circuit held invalid for
obviousness a patent covering an integrally molded hinge for securing a marker pen to a pen arm.
Id. at 317. The court discounted evidence of commercial success because the evidence showed that
while devices combining the hinge with disposable pens were commercially successful, the same was
not true when the hinge was combined with non-disposable pens, indicating that commercial success
was attributable to the public's desire for disposable pens, not the merits of the hinge. Id. at 315.
See also Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 627 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (commercial
success proportional to advertising efforts and thus not probative of nonobviousness); Litton Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (difficult to show that commercial
success of subject matter of design patent is related to design and not other factors such as improved
function or better recognized brand name); Boyer, supra note 139, at 595.
243 739 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cerg, denied, 105 S. Ct. 2138 (1985).
244 Id. at 1576.
243 Id. at 1573.
146 Id. at 1574.
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was obvious based on the prior art considerations alone. 147 The Federal Circuit, however,
reversed the trial court, reasoning that the trial court committed legal error in failing to
consider evidence of commercial success.' 18 The court agreed with the trial court that
the claimed invention would have been held obvious based on the prior art considerations
alone, but held that in this case commercial success was entitled to substantial weight
and compelled a finding of nonobviousness. 19 Simmons is illustrative of the Federal
Circuit's position that evidence of commercial success is always relevant and may be
sufficient to support a conclusion of nonobviousness) 5°
C. Licensing
Licensing of the patent to competitors in the field, commentators maintain, is evi-
dence of nonobviousness because unless these competitors were convinced of the patent's
validity, they would copy the patented device or process rather than spending money
for a license.' 5 ' Courts and commentators have made clear that for evidence of licensing
to be relevant, patentees must show that they have in fact licensed their patents to a
certain percentage of the total available license market. 152 Moreover, courts and com-
mentators assert, patentees must show that the licensees were motivated by a belief in
the patent's validity, rather than by economic considerations such as a decision that
licensing was less expensive than defending an infringement suit. 15'
The Federal Circuit does not accord evidence of licensing any independent weight
in the section 103 nonobviousness analysis, as illustrated by the court's decision in EWP
Corp. v. Reliance Universal, Inc.' 54 In EWP, the Federal Circuit held invalid for obviousness
a patent covering a method for producing wire mesh—reinforced concrete pipes having
flared ends for mating with the straight ends of adjacent pipes.' 55 The patentee offered
evidence of a successful licensing program to prove nonobviousness, but the court
dismissed the evidence.'56 The court explained that successful licensing programs are
not infallible guides to patentability because it is too difficult to establish that their success
147 Id.
"H Id. at 1574-75.
149
	 at 1575-76.
1 " For other Federal Circuit decisions indicating that evidence of commercial success is inde-
pendently relevant to the nonobviousness question, see Panduit, 774 F.2d at 1099-1100; Perkin-
Elmer, 732 F.2d at 895.
13 ' Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1178; Cnisum, supra note 1 1, at 252.
132 See Stratoflex, inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Penn. Note,
supra note 9, at 1178, where the commentator suggests that the weight given to licensing is pro-
portional to the percentage of the available market licensed.
133 See EWP, 755 F.2d at 907-08 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1178-79. Very
low royalty payments weaken the inference that licensing is related to the merits of the claimed
invention because they suggest that it was in the licensee's economic best interest to take the license,
rather than contest validity. Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1178-79. See also Schwinn Bicycle Co. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295, 300 (9th Cir. 1970), where the court stated that licenses
given to manufacture and sell the patented design For a bicycle seat in return for a royalty rate of
five cents per unit were not relevant to proving that the design would not have been obvious at the
time it was made.
134 755 F.2d 898 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
133 Id. at 899-900.
136 Id. at 907-08.
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is related to the nonobviousness of the claimed invention, and not factors such as the
beliefs of licensees that licensing is less expensive than defending an infringement suit.'"
D. Copying by an Infringer
Commentators and courts have proposed that copying by an infringer is evidence
of nonobviousness because it reflects the infringer's belief in the nonobviousness of the
claimed invention. 158 In a crowded field, commentators and courts assert, the infringer's
copying is a tribute to the nonobviousness of the claimed invention because the infringer
copies the invention when he or she recognizes that it alone solves a problem which he
or she had been trying unsuccessfully to solve. 159 For copying to be relevant to nonob-
viousness, however, courts agree that patentees must show that the infringer's copying
was related to the merits of their inventions, and not a result of a general lack of respect
for patent rights, or a belief that it was unlikely that the patentees would be willing or
financially able to enforce their,rights by instituting an infringement suit.lb0
The Federal Circuit; has , not given evidence of copying by an infringer independent
weight in the section .103 nonobviousness analysis. 161 For example, in Cable Electric
Produc.. ts, inc. v. Genrnark Inc.,'" the Federal Circuit held that evidence of copying by an
infringer is not by itself sufficient to prove nonobviousness when the prior art consid-
erations suggest that the claimed invention would have been obvioUs.' 63 In Cable Electric,
the patent involved a photosensitive lamp which automatically turned on when the
amount of light surrounding it diminished.'" The Federal Circuit affirmed an award of
summary judgment invalidating the patent for obviousness based on the prior art con-
siderations despite evidence of copying by the accused infringer which the patentee
offered to prove nonobviousness. 165 The court explained that because of the difficulty
in establishing a direct causal connection between an infringer's decision to copy and
the merits of the claimed invention, mere copying by an infringer is insufficient to show
nonobviousness.I 66
1 " Id. The concurring opinion explained that in this case evidence of secondary considerations,
including licensing, did not outbalance a finding of obviousness based on the prior art considerations
because the two prior art patents, although obscure and in foreign languages, clearly foreshadowed
the claimed invention. Id. at 908 (Davis, J., concurring).
' See Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol, Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 440-41 (1911).
og See id. at 441; Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Jones
v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
1 " See, e.g., Jones, 727 F.2d at 1531-32. Jones involved a patent covering a mold and method
for casting decorated concrete panels. The Federal Circuit considered evidence of copying probative
of nonobviousness because the copier, who had extensive experience in the field, copied the patented
invention after abandoning prior art casting methods and failing to become a distributor of the
patented prOducts. Id, at 1532.
lot The Federal Circuit does, however, consider evidence of copying to be relevant when
presented with other objective evidence of nonobviousness. See infra note 166.
162 770 F.2d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
'" See id. at 1027-29.
194 /d. at 1018.
166 Id, at 102849.
106 See id. at 1028. The Federal Circuit, however, did suggest that copying may be relevant in
the context of other evidence of nonobviousness. Id. at 1028 n.14. For example, in Panduit Corp.
v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1985), evidence that the infringer copied the one-
piece cable ties of the invention, after trying unsuccessfully for many years to develop similar cable
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E. Progress Through the Patent and Trademark Office
There is a general belief, commentators note, that the Patent and Trademark Office
grants patents too readily.'" Therefore, courts and commentators have suggested that
the fact that a patentee has difficulty obtaining a patent from the Patent and Trademark
Office supports an inference that the claimed invention must have been obvious at the
time it was made.'" For example, it may take years for a patent application to issue
because the Examiner repeatedly rejects the application, forcing the patent applicant to
respond by either disputing the grounds for rejection or by amending the claims.'"
Eventually, it is the patent applicant's dogged persistence, not the nonobviousness of the
invention, which causes the Examiner to relent and issue the patent.'" On the other
hand, the Supreme Court has suggested that particularly rapid progress through the
Patent and Trademark Office may be evidence of nonobviousness because rapid progress
indicates that no relevant prior art references existed. 171
F. Near-Simultaneous Invention
If other researchers in the field independently arrived at solutions which were the
same or similar to the patentee's solution, commentators propose that an inference that
the patentee's solution would have been obvious is created. 17" For evidence of near-
simultaneous invention to be probative of obviousness, however, the other researchers
must have been working under the same state of the art as the patentee.'" Factors such
as the level of skill of the simultaneous solvers and the amount of effort it took them to
find the solution will influence the amount of weight given to near-simultaneous inven-
tion in the obviousness analysis.'"
The Federal Circuit has indicated that near-simultaneous invention is relevant as
evidence of obviousness because it illustrates the state of the art prevailing at the time
the patentee made his or her discovery.'" H owever, the Federal Circuit does not consider
near-simultaneous invention to be conclusive proof of obviousness.'" The Federal Circuit
has explained that patent interference practice, which is designed to determine priority
among inventors claiming to have made the same invention, implicitly recognizes that
ties, was used to show that the cable ties of the invention filled a long-felt need, and that therefore
the invention would not have been obvious at the time it was made. See id. at 1099.
"7 See Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1183.
168
 Id. See also Philips Elec. & Pharmaceutical Indus. Corp. v. Thermal & Elec. Indus. Inc., 450
F.2d 1164, 1175 (3d Cir. 1971). In Philips, the court held invalid for obviousness a patent covering
a method of making glass-to-metal seals used in electrical devices. Id. at 1166. The court drew a
negative inference of patentability From the fact that it took twelve years for the patent to issue
after a "long and tortuous path" in the Patent Office. Id. at 1175.
The Federal Circuit has not considered progress through the Patent and Trademark Office,
probably because litigants rarely present such evidence.
'99
	 Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1183.
170 See Philips, 450 F.2d at 1175.
in See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52 (1966) (fact that in a crowded field Examiner
could find no references to cite against application weighs in favor of nonobviousness).
172 Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1180; Cntsum, supra note 11, at 258.
"3 Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1180; CH15UM, supra note 11, at 258.
174 Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1181.
173 In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
170 See Environmental Designs, 713 F.2d at 698 n.7.
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two or more inventors may independently arrive at a patentable invention, which by
statutory definition is nonobvious.'"
G. Professional Approval
The fact that experts in the field expressed approval, surprise, disbelief, or skepti-
cism when the patentee first introduced his or her solution to the public is evidence that
the solution is nonobvious, according to commentators, because the experts' reactions
reflect the general state of mind of those skilled in the art at the time the patentee
developed his or her solution.'" This type of expert opinion, commentators maintain,
is more reliable than adversarial expert opinion because it is less susceptible to distor-
tion.'"
The Federal Circuit considers evidence of professional approval to be highly pro-
bative of nonobviousness, as illustrated by In re Piasecki."° In Piasecki, the patent applicant
submitted evidence showing that when he first introduced the aircraft of his invention,
experts immediately hailed it as a significant innovation in aircraft design, with one
expert calling it the greatest advance in forty years. 18 ' Experts also praised the patent
applicant's aircraft in technical journals and reports.'" The Federal Circuit ruled that
the patent applicant's evidence of professional approval indicated that the claimed in-
vention would not have been obvious at the time it was made, and accordingly reversed
the Patent Examiner's conclusion of obviousness based on the prior art considerations.'"
Individual secondary considerations, therefore, are related to the obviousness issue
through a series of inferences.'" Courts have found secondary considerations to be
useful as non-technical evidence of obviousness or nonobviousness.'" The Federal Cir-
cuit's position is that secondary considerations in general form the fourth part of the
section 103 nonobviousness test. I86 According to the Federal Circuit, under some circum-
stances evidence of long-felt but unsolved need,'" commercial success,'" and profes-
sional approvall" may be given greater weight than the prior art considerations because
'" See id.
178
	 Note, supra note 9, at 1181-82. See also Gore, 721 F.2d at 1545; Woodstream Corp. v.
Herter's, Inc., 446 F.2d 1143, 1153-57 (8th Cir. 1971). In Gore, for example, the Federal Circuit
held that the invention, a method of rapidly stretching highly crystalline, unsintered teflon to
produce a soft, porous material which the patentee marketed as "Goretex," would not have been
obvious at the time it was made. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1556. The court considered evidence that
suppliers of teflon, such as ICI and du Pont, labeled the new product "magical" and "bewitching,"
and that du Pont scientists greeted the product with skepticism and disbelief, to be probative of
nonobviousness. Id. at 1545, 1555-56. •
179 Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1182. But see E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF
THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS, ch.6, 889 (2d ed. 1979) (professional approval is a form of hearsay
expert testimony because it is not usually addressed to the technical patent question).
'" 745 F.2d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
' 81 M. at 1473.
182 Id. at 1474.
/d. at 1475.
1 " See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
I" See supra notes 116-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of long-felt but unsolved
need.
'" See supra notes 135-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of commercial success.
1B9 See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of professional approval.
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these secondary considerations are highly probative of nonobviousness.'" On the other
hand, the Federal Circuit's decisions indicate that this is not true for evidence of licen-
sing,m copying by an infringer, 192 and near-simultaneous invention.'" The Federal
Circuit's position is significant because it states the authoritative position regarding
secondary considerations which the federal district courts and the Patent and Trademark
Office will follow in applying section 103. 191 The Supreme Court will most likely defer
to the Federal Circuit, according to commentators, because the Court apparently rec-
ognizes that Congress intended the Federal Circuit to establish uniform standards in the
patent law area, and because the Court's caseload is already very heavy.'" The following
section will critically evaluate the use of secondary considerations in the section 103
nonobviousness analysis.
III. A CRITIQUE OF USING SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS AS PART OF THE SECTION 103
NONORVIOUSNESS TEST
To be consistent with the statutory language of section 103, 1 " secondary consider-
ations which are probative of the state of mind of a hypothetical person having ordinary
skill in the art at the time the invention was made should form the fourth part of the
section 103 nonobviousness test. Secondary considerations which are relevant to the state
of mind issue include long-felt but unsolved need, professional approval, and near-
simultaneous invention. 107
 These secondary considerations may be given equal or greater
weight than prior art considerations. Commercial success, licensing, copying by an in-
fringer, and progress through the Patent and Trademark Office,'" however, are not
relevant to the state of mind issue, and should never be given any independent weight
in the section 103 nonobviousness analysis. Commercial success, licensing, and copying
by an infringer are only relevant when offered as evidence of long-felt but unsolved
need to show fulfillment of the need.
Section 103 requires courts to evaluate whether the claimed invention would have
been obvious at the time it was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.'"
199 See supra notes 123-34,143-50,180-83 and accompanying text.
19 ' See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of licensing.
1 "2 See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of copying by an infringer.
I93 See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of near-simultaneous inven-
tion.
See supra note 34.
195 See supra note 34. The Federal Circuit's position may conflict with the Supreme Court's
position. See supra note 95. But see Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1557
(Fed. Cir. 1985). In Fromson, the Federal Circuit stated that the requirement that secondary consid-
erations should always be evaluated as part of the obviousness analysis is not inconsistent with
Anderson's Black-Rock, where the Supreme Court stated that more than commercial success was
necessary in order to establish patentable invention. Id.
' 96 Section 103 requires that to be patentable, an invention must not have been obvious at the
time it was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining to the field of the invention.
35 U.S.C. 103 (1985).
"7 See infra notes 202-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of why long-felt but unsolved
need, professional approval, and near-simultaneous invention are relevant to the state of mind
issue.
196 See infra notes 219-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of why commercial success,
licensing, copying by an infringer, and progress through the Patent and Trademark Office are not
relevant to the state of mind issue.
199 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1985).
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Therefore, to be consistent with the statutory language of section 103, 400 the relevance
of individual secondary considerations must depend upon whether they enable courts
to infer from the circumstances surrounding the development of the claimed invention
the state of mind of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art at the time
the claimed invention was made. Secondary considerations which serve this purpose
provide a frame of reference for assessing what the pertinent prior art would have
suggested to this hypothetical person, and thus prevent courts from relying on hindsight
or reading the inventor's own discovery into the prior arOm
A. Secondary Considerations Which Are Relevant in Applying Section 103
Long-felt but unsolved need, near-simultaneous invention, and professional ap-
proval are relevant in applying the section 103 nonobviousness requirement because
each gives direct insight into the conventional wisdom in the field of the invention at
the time the patentee made his or her discovery. 202 Long-felt but unsolved need and
near-simultaneous invention illustrate the conventional wisdom by examining the efforts
of other researchers in the field working under the same state of the art as the patentee
to solve an existing defect in a device or process. From evidence of long-felt but unsolved
need one infers nonobviousness from the failure of these researchers to find a solution
and the success of the patentee's solution. 2" Conversely, from evidence of near-simul-
taneous invention one infers obviousness from the fact that these researchers developed
solutions which were identical or similar to the patentee's solution. 2°4 Professional ap-
proval illustrates the conventional wisdom by examining the reactions of experts when
the patentee first introduced his or her discovery. 20 If these experts, who presumably
have a thorough knowledge of the conventional wisdom in the art, expressed disbelief
or showered the patentee's discovery with praise, one can infer that the discovery would
not have been obvious. 206
The Federal Circuit's decision in Piasecki illustrates the utility of long-felt but un-
solved need in applying section 103. 20 In Piasecki, the court carefully applied the long-
felt but unsolved need test as commentators have suggested it should be applied. 2"s First,
2°0 Id,
2° ' See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 36 (1966). Although a second reason for using
secondary considerations is that they are easier than technical facts for courts to apply in evaluating
the obviousness issue, this is not their primary function. It is the reponsibility of the attorneys to
present the technical issues to the court in an understandable manner.
2°2 The law presumes that the hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art thinks along
the lines of the conventional wisdom in the art. Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774
F.2d 448,454 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
2° See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between
evidence of long-felt but unsolved need and nonobviousness.
2°, See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship betweeen
evidence of near-simultaneous invention and obviousness.
2°5 See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between
evidence of professional approval and nonobviousness.
2°6 See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relatiOnship between
evidence of professional approval and nonobviousness.
20' 745 F.2d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Federal Circuit's decision in Piasecki.
2" See Piasecki, 745 F,2d at 1473-75, See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text for a
discussion of how commentators have suggested the long-felt but unsolved need test should be
applied.
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the court found that a recognized long-felt need existed by noting that several govern-
mental agencies were looking for an aircraft which could lift heavy loads but did not
suffer from the lack of control which existing aircraft exhibited, and that these agencies
sponsored a workshop to find a solution. 209 At the workshop, forty-seven specialists in
aircraft technology proposed solutions to the problem, but all were unsuccessful. 210 Next,
the court found that the applicant's solution successfully fulfilled the need, as evidenced
by the immediate approval of experts and the decision of private and governmental
sources to fund further development?"
Piasecki also illustrates the utility of professional approval in applying section 103. 212
In Piasecki, the Federal Circuit, analyzing evidence of professional approval as commen-
tators have suggested it should be analyzed, 215 examined the reactions of experts in the
aircraft technology field when the applicant first introduced his invention.2" Evidence
that experts regarded the invention as a significant innovation in airship design, and
perhaps the greatest advance in forty years, indicated that the invention would not have
been obvious at the time it was made. 21
The weight which the Federal Circuit gave to the secondary considerations of long-
felt but unsolved need and professional approval in Piasecki was consistent with the
mandate of section 103. Evidence of long-felt but unsolved need and professional ap-
proval raised an inference of nonobviousness by illustrating the state of mind of a person
having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made, and rebutted the
Examiner's conclusion of obviousness based on a hindsight evaluation of the prior art. 216
Therefore, by mitigating the effect of hindsight on the obviousness determination, long-
felt but unsolved need and professional approval form a valuable part of the section
103 test and may properly be given equal or greater weight than prior art considerations.
Although the Federal Circuit has not given much weight to near-simultaneous
invention, such evidence is relevant in showing that the claimed invention would have
been obvious because it manifests the state of the art prevailing at the time the patentee
made his or her discovery. 212 Thus, evidence of near-simultaneous invention enables
courts to infer the state of mind of a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time
of the discovery, and should always be considered as part of the section 103 test. However,
evidence of near-simultaneous invention should not, by itself, preclude patentability'
because patent interference practice recognizes that an invention may be patentable, and
hence by statutory definition nonobvious, despite contemporaneous development by two
or more inventors. 2 "
Thus, long-felt need, professional approval, and near-simultaneous invention are
secondary considerations which are relevant in applying section 103 because each illus-
2°9
 Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1473-74.
210 Id. at 1475.
211 Id,
712 See id. at 1473-75.
213 Id. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of how commentators
have suggested evidence of professional approval should be evaluated.
2 " Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1473-75.
2 ' 5 Id.
716 See id. at 1474-75.
217 In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
210 See Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil of California, 713 F.2d 693, 698 n.7 (Fed. Cir.
1983), ceri. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); E.1. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., Inc.,
620 F.2d 1247, 1265 (8th Cir. 1980).
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trates the conventional wisdom in the field of the invention when the invention was
made. These secondary considerations are probative of the state of mind of a person
having ordinary skill in the art when the patentee made his or her discovery, and should
form the fourth part of the section 103 nonobviousness test.
B. Secondary Considerations Which Are Not Relevant in Applying Section 103
Commercial success, licensing, copying by an infringer, and progress through the
Patent and Trademark Office are not independently relevant in applying section 103
because they indicate nothing regarding the conventional wisdom in the art prevailing
at the time the patentee made his or her discovery. This is because these secondary
considerations do not examine the actions of experts and researchers actually involved
in the field at the time the patentee made his or her discovery. Instead, these secondary
considerations focus on the actions of buyers, businesspeople, infringers, and the Patent
and Trademark Office, respectively, which may be influenced by a variety of factors
completely unrelated to the merits of the claimed invention. 219
Commercial success is not independently relevant in applying section 103 because
it attempts to infer nonobviousness from the favorable response of buyers to devices or
processes embodying the patentee's discovery. 220 The rationale supporting the use of
commercial success as evidence of nonobviousness rests on two assumptions. First, that
the possibility of achieving commercial success motivated other researchers to find a
solution to the problem which the patentee solved. 22 ' Second, that if the patentee's
solution was commercially successful, these researchers failed to solve the problem, and
thus the patentee's solution could not have been obvious. 222 The supporting rationale
also assumes that the buyers' response is due to the innovative qualities of the patentee's
discovery, rather than the operation of extraneous forces. 223 The supporting rationale,
therefore, is similar to the long-felt but unsolved need rationale, except that it infers the
failure of other researchers from the actions of buyers, rather than from the actions of
the researchers themselves.
The rationale supporting the use of commercial success is flawed in two ways. First,
there is no basis for inferring the failure of others from the commercial success of the
patentee's solution. 224 The only legitimate means for demonstrating the failure of others
is through direct proof. Second, it is unreasonable to assume that the buyers' response
is due to the merits of the claimed invention. 225 Unlike the reaction of experts when the
patentee first introduces his or her discovery, the reaction of buyers could be due to
numerous factors unrelated to innovation, including successful advertising and market-
219 See infra notes 220-55 and accompanying text.
229 See Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.; New Standards for Patents, 491 PAT. Orr. Soc'v 237,283
(1967).
221 See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale underlying
the use of commercial success as evidence of nono bviousness.
222 See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale underlying
the use of commercial success as evidence of nono bviousness.
222 Sec supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale underlying
the use of commercial success as evidence of nono bviousness.
221 Kitch, supra note 220, at 283.
225 Id.
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ing efforts ,226 especially where consumer products are involved. 227 Although courts pur-
port to isolate the exact cause of favorable buyer response, in practice it is almost
impossible to do so. 225 Commentators advocating the use of commercial success have
suggested that the commercial success analysis should involve two steps. 229 First, the
patentee must establish the actual existence of commercial success from proof of market
share, comparative sales figures, etc., and not from absolute sales figures. 230 Second, the
patentee must demonstrate a nexus between the commercial success and the merits of
the claimed invention. 231 Courts, however, tend to ignore this analysis, as illustrated by
the Federal Circuit's decision in Simmons. 232
In Simmons, the decision turned entirely upon what the court characterized as
extremely strong evidence of commercial success."' The evidence, however, consisted
only of the parties' stipulation that both the patentee and accused infringer had sold
millions of devices embodying the claimed invention. 2 S1 There was no attempt to show
market share, comparative sales figures, or other accepted indicia of commercial suc-
cess."5 Nevertheless, the court held that the absolute sales figures established the exis-
tence of commercial success. 236 The court then stated that the requisite nexus existed
between commercial success and the merits of the patentee's invention, citing the portion
of the trial court's opinion describing the absolute sales figures for support.237 The court
concluded that the commercial success evidence in Simmons compelled a finding of
nonobviousness. 2S 5 The court noted, however, that it would have reached the opposite
result without the commercial success evidence. 239
As the Federal Circuit's decision in Simmons demonstrates, commercial success is
both irrelevant and misleading, especially when not scrutinized rigorously, because it
shifts the focus of the obviousness inquiry from the state of mind of a worker having
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to the economic value of the
patent. 24" Economic value alone, however, does not make an invention patentable. 24 1
Therefore, evidence of commercial success should never be given any independent
weight in applying section 103. Instead, such evidence is only relevant when submitted
776 See Boyer, supra note 139, at 595; CHISUM, supra note 1 1, at 244.
2" Boyer, supra note 139, at 595.
725 See CHISUM, supra note 11, at 244.
229 See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
2311 See id.
731 See id.
232
	
F.2d 1573 (Fed. 'Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2138 (1985). See supra notes 143-49
for a discussion of Simmons.
2" See Simmons, 739 F.2d at 1576.
7" See id. at 1574.
235
 See id.
23" See id. at 1574-76.
237 Id. at 1574-75.
23"
	 at 1576.
239 See id. at 1575-76.
23° See Kitch, supra note 220, at 287.
241
 Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
requires that for an invention to be patentable, the invention must be sufficiently innovative to
justify granting the inventor a monopoly over its use. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying
text.
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as evidence of long-felt but unsolved need to demonstrate successful fulfillment of the
need.2 4 2
Like commercial success, evidence of licensing is irrelevant to the obviousness anal-
ysis. The rationale supporting the use of licensing assumes that business competitors
purchase a license, instead of copying the patented device or process, because they are
convinced that the claimed invention would not have been obvious at the time it was
made. 2" This says more about the state of mind of the businesspeople, however, than
about the state of the art prevailing at the time the patentee made his or her discovery.
The decision to license may simply reflect the fact that they considered licensing a less
expensive alternative than defending an infringement suit, especially if the royalties are
low.244 It is almost impossible to establish a clear nexus between a business competitor's
decision to purchase a license and the merits of the claimed invention.
The Federal Circuit recognized the difficulty in establishing a nexus between licen-
sing and the merits of the claimed invention in EWP.242 Accordingly, the court refused
to give evidence of a successful licensing program, which the patentee had offered as
proof of nonobviousness, greater weight than the prior art considerations, which the
court held suggested the claimed invention.2" As the Federal Circuit's decision in EWP
correctly indicates, evidence of licensing should never be given any independent weight
in evaluating nonobviousness because it is irrelevant to the state of mind of a person
having ordinary skill in the art at the time the inventor made his or her discovery.
Instead, evidence of licensing, like evidence of commercial success, is only relevant as
evidence of long-felt but unsolved need to show successful fulfillment of the need.
Copying by a patent infringer is similarly not probative of nonobviousness. The
rationale supporting the use of copying as evidence of nonobviousness assumes that the
infringer copies the patented invention when he or she realizes that it provides a solution
to a problem which he or she had previously tried unsuccessfully to solve. 247 The
infringer's copying, according to this rationale, reflects the infringer's belief in the
nonobviousness of the invention. 20 In actuality, however, copying by an infringer may
reflect a business decision that copying was less expensive than obtaining a license. It
may also indicate a general lack of regard for patent rights. 249 It does not, however,
illustrate the state of mind of a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the
invention was made because it focuses on the actions of business competitors, rather
than researchers working contemporaneously with the patentee. In addition, the copying
rationale is diametrically opposed to the licensing rationale, which asserts that nonob-
viousness is demonstrated by the licensee's decision not to copy the invention.
242 See Citisum, supra note 11, at 242.
"3 See supra note 151 and accompanying text for a discussion of the basis for using licensing
as evidence of nonobviousness.
244 See supra note 153.
243 755 F.2d 898, 907-08 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text for
a discussion of EWP.
246 See EWP, 755 F.2d at 907-08.
347 See supra note 159.
"3 See id.
249 Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also
Penn. Note, supra note 9, at 1179, where the commentator notes that "[Once ... the ordinary bias
of competitors would be to disrespect the validity of a threatening patent, such evidence [of copying)
ought rarely be determinative."
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In Cable Electric,25° the Federal Circuit correctly observed that because it is not
possible to establish an unambiguous nexus between copying and the merits of the
patented invention, it would be overly simplistic to use evidence of copying to support
a conclusion of nonobviousness. 25 ' The court then properly held the patent at issue
invalid for obviousness based on prior art considerations. 252 As the Federal Circuit's
decision in Cable Electric shows, evidence of copying by an infringer is not probative of
nonobviousness because it does not help courts avoid relying on hindsight or reading
the inventor's own disclosure into the prior art when applying the section 103 nonob-
viousness test. Thus, evidence of copying by an infringer is irrelevant and should never
be given any independent weight in the context of section 103. Instead, copying by an
infringer is only relevant when presented with evidence of long-felt but unsolved need,
where it may be used to show that other skilled workers failed to solve the problem
which the patentee solved. 253
Progress through the Patent and Trademark Office is the least reliable of all the
secondary considerations because the absence of a direct causal relationship between it
and the obviousness or nonobviousness of the claimed invention is the most pronounced.
A patent application's progress through the Patent and Trademark Office may be
affected by any number of factors unrelated to its merits, not the least of which is the
ability of the patent attorney responsible for it. 254 Its progess in no way reflects the
circumstances surrounding the development of the claimed invention. Therefore, courts
should completely disregard evidence of progress through the Patent and Trademark
Office in applying section 103.
Commercial success, licensing, copying by an infringer, and progress through the
Patent and Trademark Office are secondary considerations which are not independently
relevant in applying section 103. These secondary considerations are not independently
relevant because they infer nonobviousness from the actions of buyers, businesspeople,
infringers, and the Patent and Trademark Office, respectively, which do not illustrate
the state of mind of a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention
was made. Commercial success, licensing, copying by an infringer, and progress through
the Patent and Trademark Office will only mislead courts in evaluating nonobviousness
by improperly focusing the section 103 inquiry solely on the economic value of the
claimed invention. 255 Thus these secondary considerations should not form the fourth
part of the section 103 test, and should never be entitled to any independent weight in
evaluating nonobviousness.
CONCLUSION
Section 103 requires as a condition for patentability that the invention must not
have been obvious at the time it was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.
255
 770 F.2d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Cable Electric.
251 Cable Electric, 770 F.2d at 1028.
252 1d.
2" See id. at 1028 n.14. Therefore, it is the copier's failure to solve the problem which is relevant,
and not his subsequent copying.
254 KITCH & PERLMAN, supra note 179, at 889-90.
2" Kitch, supra note 220, at 287. This is contrary to the mandate of article I, section 8 of the
Constitution. See supra note 241.
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Courts have used non-technical, objective factors called secondary considerations as aids
in evaluating nonobviousness. The purpose of using secondary considerations in the
context of section 103 is to ascertain the state of mind of a hypothetical worker having
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made by examining the circum-
stances surrounding the development of the invention. This purpose is consistent with
the statutory language of section 103 which requires that the claimed invention must
not have been obvious at the time it was made.
Long-felt but unsolved need, professional approval, and near-simultaneous inven-
tion are secondary considerations which are relevant to the state of mind issue because
each directly illustrates the conventional wisdom in the field of the invention when the
invention was made. Therefore, these three secondary considerations should form the
fourth part of the section 103 nonobviousness test, and may properly be given equal or
greater weight than prior art considerations. On the other hand, commercial success,
licensing, copying by an infringer, and progress through the Patent and Trademark
Office are secondary considerations which are not relevant to the state of mind issue
because there is no clear nexus between each of these secondary considerations and the
merits of the claimed invention. Therefore, commercial success, licensing, copying by
an infringer, and progress through the Patent and Trademark Office should never be
given any independent weight in applying section 103. Instead, commercial success,
licensing, and copying by an infringer are only relevant as evidence of long-felt but
unsolved need to demonstrate successful fulfillment of the need.
The most effective way to resolve the controversy surrounding the proper role of
secondary considerations in applying the section 103 nonobviousness requirement is for
Congress to amend section 103. Congressional action is necessary because it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court will disturb the precedents established by the Federal Circuit
regarding secondary considerations. 256 The amendment should make it clear that the
relevancy of secondary considerations depends on whether they are probative of the
state of mind of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the inventor made his
or her discovery. The amendment should then provide that when available, secondary
considerations relevant to the state of mind issue form the fourth inquiry under section
103, in addition to the three prior art-related inquiries. The amendment should also be
careful to note that the absence of secondary considerations will not negate the patent-
ability of the claimed invention because the existence of secondary considerations is not
a requirement for patentability. In this way it is possible to ensure a role in the section
103 analysis for only those secondary considerations which are relevant to the state of
mind issue.
DOROTHY WHELAN
256 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
